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John Weeks
The current discourse on inequality within countries, and especially within the developed market econo-
mies of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), must be placed in his-
torical context. A long period of the growth of international trade within a laissez-faire framework and 
colonial expansion characterized the second half of the nineteenth century, with the United Kingdom the 
dominant country, being overtaken by a group of later developers, principally the United States of Amer-
ica, Germany, and France. This period of relative peace among the advanced countries came to an end in 
1914, with the outbreak of the First World War (or, ‘the Great War’, as it was called at the time).
The thirty years that followed brought a series of disasters to the developed world: hyper-inﬂ  ation 
in Germany, the Great Depression, and a second global war. Almost without exception, the leadership of 
the mainstream parties in the developed countries, from Christian Democrats through the various Socialist 
parties, concluded that these disasters resulted from instabilities inherent in market economies. In particu-
lar, there arose a consensus that the two great authoritarian political systems of the century, fascism and 
communism, had in no small part arisen from the consequences of those instabilities. 
In the academic literature, the prominent British economist K. W. Rothschild made this connec-
tion in what was perhaps the profession’s leading periodical, the Economic Journal (Rothschild, 1947). 
Discussing the tendency towards concentration of economic power in major international markets, Roth-
schild referred to “the most violent aspect of the oligopolistic struggle, the attempts of the biggest oligop-
olistic groupings to regroup their forces on a world scale” (Rothschild, 1947: 318). He argued that a char-
acteristic of this regrouping on a world scale was the anti-social effect of oligopolistic competition: “there 
is no fundamental difference between ‘economic activities like cut-throat pricing’ and ‘modern wars and 
armed interventions’” (Rothschild, 1947: 317). He went on to conclude, “that Fascism…has been largely 
brought into power by [the] struggle…of the most powerful oligopolists to strengthen through political 
action, their position in the labour market and vis-à-vis their smaller competitors, and ﬁ  nally to strike out 
in order to change the world market situation in their favour” (Rothschild, 1947: 318).
At the beginning of the twenty-ﬁ  rst century, it is startling to read such strong political conclusions 
anywhere, much less in a major economics journal. That such views would be held by a mainstream econ-
omist, and published in a leading technical journal, reﬂ  ects the generally accepted view of the time that 
two wars, a disastrous depression, and the rise of two authoritarian systems were evidence of something 
fundamentally amiss with competitive capitalism that was insufﬁ  ciently regulated and contained funda-
mental problems that went well beyond ‘market failures’. Many of the institutions established in the last 
years of the Second World War, in San Francisco, Washington, D.C. and Bretton Woods, were designed to 
limit the working of markets mechanisms at the international level. 
In 1944, the Declaration of the International Labour Organization had afﬁ  rmed, with more hope 
than likelihood, that ‘labour is not a commodity’. In 1945, the International Monetary Fund was created 
with two main purposes that seem quite extraordinary at the beginning of the twenty-ﬁ  rst century: main-2  DESA Working Paper No. 6
taining economic prosperity among countries and strictly limiting the market in currencies through a ﬁ  xed 
exchange rate system. Fixed exchange rates, based on a US dollar with a ﬁ  xed gold price, was designed to 
end ‘competitive devaluations’ (‘beggar thy neighbour’ devaluations), the purpose of which was to ‘export 
unemployment’. So far is current thinking from the concerns of sixty years ago that these phrases, which 
to contemporaries encapsulated the lessons of catastrophic experience, seem quaint and absurd.
The commitment of post-war leaders to preventing the international rise of uncontrollable cor-
porate power had its domestic aspect, which was pursued with even greater zeal. Along with the concern 
that the rise of corporate power was a threat to democratic institutions went the closely linked view that 
excessive concentrations of private income and wealth was a manifestation of that threat at the household 
and individual levels. The broad political support for policies to restrict the concentration of wealth and 
income came from strong trade union movements in most of the countries, which, again, at the beginning 
of the twenty-ﬁ  rst century seems an anachronism. The growing international rivalry between the United 
States and the then Soviet Union reinforced the political commitment in the ‘free world’ to policies of 
limiting inequality, with the political leadership in Washington recognizing a need to demonstrate the 
superiority of the market system in providing for the welfare of its citizens.
It is the argument of this paper that income inequality has increased in several, but not all, de-
veloped countries over the last twenty years. The increase in some countries supports the conclusion that 
the deregulation of markets, resulting in the concentration of economic power, is the fundamental cause 
as well as the gross manifestation of inequality of both income and wealth. The argument is developed 
as follows. The next section presents the abstract analytics of income distribution, to demonstrate that 
theoretical inconsistencies in the neoclassical framework lead to the conclusion that the functional dis-
tribution of income, and, therefore, the size distribution, is indeterminate without considering bargaining 
power. The following section reviews the movements in income inequality in seventeen OECD countries, 
which produces a clear distinction between ‘the Anglo-Saxon four’ and the other thirteen. The penultimate 
section considers causation, using a simple statistical exercise to support the argument that where income 
inequality has increased, it resulted from the imbalance in bargaining power resulting from the deregula-
tion of markets. The concluding section proposes a change in the economic and political agendas in which 
the central task of policy is to reverse the measures which have caused the imbalance in bargaining power. 
Analytical framework
The orthodox argument against interventions to reduce inequality derives from an analysis that concludes 
that income distribution arises from the production technology of an economy, and that the resulting dis-
tribution is technically determined, economically efﬁ  cient, and unique given that technology. It follows, 
therefore, that inequality reﬂ  ects the distribution of assets, including so-called human capital,1 and the 
efﬁ  cient return to those assets. In the context of globalization, this argument is extended to maintain that 
if it is the case that globalization has been associated within increased inequality, this results from irresist-
ible technological and demographic factors that cannot be countered; or, if attempts are made to counter 
them, the result is to foster inefﬁ  ciency and undermine competitiveness.
1  So-called because the concept lacks one of the central characteristics of capital: vendibility. ‘Human capital’ refers 
to the enhancement of the skills of a person, usually acquired through education of some sort. While the labouring 
time of the skilled person can be sold, the asset in question, being skilled, cannot be sold, except in a slave society. 
An asset which cannot be bought and sold is not capital.Inequality Trends in Some Developed OECD Countries  3
However, this argument, that distribution is technically determined, is logically ﬂ  awed. It derives 
from an analysis based upon the concept of a unique aggregate production function that dictates aggregate 
distribution, whose validity was refuted in the famous Cambridge Controversy (Robinson, 1969; Har-
court, 1972). The refutation begins with a simple two-commodity economy in which there is one output, 
one input, and the input is completely used in each period (capital has a lifespan of one period). To pro-
duce the commodities, there is a range of methods with ﬁ  xed coefﬁ  cients, and capitalists choose the most 
proﬁ  table given the factor prices that they face. The combined methods for the two commodities, one an 
input into the other, constitute the technology of the economy. The production conditions for the economy 
using a technology designated as A, with 1 standing for the output and 2 for the input, can be written as 
follows (for greater detail, see Weeks, 1989):
(unit capital cost)1 + (unit labour cost)1 + (unit proﬁ  t)1 = (price)1
(unit capital cost)2 + (unit labour cost)2 + (unit proﬁ  t)2 = (price)2
The terms in italics sum to the aggregate value added of the economy. In more detail, this can be 
written as:
p(a2)k(a1) + p(a1)wl(a1) + (proﬁ  t)(a1) = p(a1)
p(a2)k(a2) + p(a1)wl(a2) + (proﬁ  t)(a2)= p(a2)
Where the p’s are prices, k’s are the unit capital inputs, w is the amount of the output workers 
consume, and the l’s are unit labour inputs, for technology A. If we omit the technology symbols, set the 
prices of the output to unity (so that p = p2/p1), and deﬁ  ne r as the proﬁ  t rate on capital, we obtain:
[1 + r]pk1 + wl1 = 1
[1 + r]pk2 + wl2 = 1
These two equations can be solved simultaneously for the proﬁ  t rate. This allows the proﬁ  t rate to 
be expressed as follows, as function of the wage rate and technical parameters:
r = [1 – wl1]÷[k2 + w(k2l1 – k1l2)]
The neoclassical term for this equation is ‘factor price frontier’ (FPF). It gives the proﬁ  t rate im-
plied by any real wage. If it is a straight line (linear), then the real wage and proﬁ  ts are determinate when 
one adds a neoclassical labour market: equilibrium in the labour market determines w,2 and w implies r. 
When the wage rises, capitals switch to a more capital intensive technique, and when the wage falls, to a 
more labour intensive one. However, inspection of the equation shows that the factor price frontier will be 
a straight line if and only if k2l1 = k1l2;3 that is, if the input and the output have the same factor intensity. 
In general, the factor price frontier will be convex (input more capital intensive) or concave (output more 
capital intensive). If the factor price frontier is non-linear, it implies that FPFs for different technologies 
can intersect twice. This analysis results in an extremely important theoretical prediction: when the real 
2  More precisely, equilibrium in the labour market produces the money wage, p1wl1, as part of a general equilib-
rium system in which prices, outputs and the real wage are determined simultaneously.
3  In this special case, the equation becomes r = 1 - w(l/k).4  DESA Working Paper No. 6
wage goes up, prompting a capitalist to change technology, he/she may ﬁ  nd it proﬁ  table to choose a more 
labour intensive one, and vice versa. In other words, clearing of the labour market no longer produces a 
unique proﬁ  t rate, even if technological possibilities remain constant. 
We can now summarize the practical implications of this apparently arcane analysis. The labour 
market does not produce a unique distribution between wages and proﬁ  ts on the basis of technical pa-
rameters, because there are many possible market-clearing wage and proﬁ  t combinations. It is a trivial 
extension of this analysis to include additional factors of production, such as labour of different skills, and 
convert the discussion from the functional to the size distribution of income. Which general equilibrium is 
realized, and its associated distribution, will be determined in part by the relative bargaining power of the 
various economic agents. Economic theory concludes that within a broad range of outcomes, distribution 
results from relative bargaining power. This is the analytical framework we use to consider actual changes 
in distribution, after reviewing the empirical evidence.
Trends in inequality
In anticipation of the presentation of the empirical evidence, a brief discussion of measures of inequality 
is necessary. Many measures are used in empirical work, and our presentation restricts itself to the Gini 
coefﬁ  cient, not because of its superiority over other calculations of inequality, but because of the frequen-
cy of its use. It assigns diminishing weights as incomes rise, which can be seen as an advantage if one is 
inequality-averse. Its major drawback is that it is relatively insensitive to changes in the middle range of a 
distribution. As a result, two distributions can yield the same index, though their income frequencies differ 
—a special case of the general problem of Lorenz curves crossing. 
In this section we review the changes in inequality in the major industrial countries, with the pur-
pose, ﬁ  rst, of identifying trends, and, second, of drawing conclusions about the major forces underlying 
those changes. In the previous section it was demonstrated that income distribution cannot be determined 
technically, even in the abstract. However, this conclusion need not in itself undermine the apologies for 
globalization-driven inequality, which can be defended by various ad hoc arguments. In particular, we in-
spect the hypothesis that increases in inequality reﬂ  ect characteristics of the economic forces determining 
growth in the late twentieth century, forces allegedly inherent in that growth, beyond the power of policy 
to inﬂ  uence or arrest. In other words, increases in equality represent an irresistible development driven 
by fundamental technological and demographic forces. This is not a difﬁ  cult hypothesis to test. Were it 
true, one would expect a general tendency across countries, manifest in varying degrees, for inequality to 
increase.
With this hypothesis in mind, we can inspect Table 1, which shows the average Gini coefﬁ  cients 
for seventeen developed OECD countries for four decades (see also Figures 1-3). The countries divide 
into three groups: 1) those with a rising trend in inequality, all of which, except Canada, are so-called An-
glo-Saxon countries (four: Australia, New Zealand, the United Kingdom, and the United States); 2) those 
with a falling trend (again, four: Canada, Italy, Norway and Spain); and 3) those showing no trend (nine: 
Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Japan, Netherlands and Sweden).4
4  For discussions of inequality in some of these countries, see Atkinson (1995, comparison of the United States and 
European countries), Becker and Hauser (2002, Germany), Burniaux and others (1998, OECD countries), Cornia 
(2004, developed countries), Cornia, Addison and Kiiski (2004, developed countries), Jantti (1997, US and Euro-
pean), Piketty (2001, France), and Saunders (2003, Australia).Inequality Trends in Some Developed OECD Countries  5
Table 1:
Gini coefﬁ  cients by decade, 17 OECD countries













































































































































































































































Sources: Austria: Gusenleitner, Winter-Ebmer & Zweimuller (1996); Germany: Becker & Hauser (2002); All others: Dollar & 
Kraay or WIDER.
Notes: na = not available or not consistent with other years; n = number of observations per decade, with total under ‘last year’; 
boxed = by country, highest average for the four decades; coef var = coefﬁ  cient of variation (standard deviation divided by the 
average); Earlier decades – Canada: 1950s, 32.3 (1951 & 1957); USA: 1940s, 37.5 (1947-49); 1950s, 36.3 (all years).
High-income OECD countries not included: Greece, Luxembourg, Portugal, and Switzerland.
While there are some variations in deﬁ  nitions among the countries, with few exceptions the measures are for gross personal 
income before taxes.The absence of a global pattern is strong prima facie evidence that trends and non-trends reﬂ  ect 
policies, not inexorable forces beyond the inﬂ  uence of governments. First, it should not be controversial 
that the four countries with trends towards greater inequality are those which pursued a broadly similar 
policy programme that has come to be called ‘neoliberal’.5 Second, without exception, the rising inequality 
manifested itself in the four countries during the years when that broadly similar policy agenda was pur-
sued most vigorously, especially the 1980s, but also the 1990s. In each of these countries, the decade aver-
age inequality for the 1980s and 1990s was higher than in the pre-liberalization 1960s and 1970s. Finally, 
5  For a theoretical model of why inequality differs across countries, see Benabou (2000).
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Figure 1:
Gini coefficients for the United States, Canada
























































































































9while the Governments of the other thirteen countries introduced policy changes that may have reduced the 
social protection associated with the welfare state, none consistently pursued neoliberal policies.
Thus, two conclusions derive from Table 1, which are beyond challenge. First, in the vast major-
ity of countries there was no trend increase in inequality. This alone prompts one to reject the hypothesis 
that inherent in the global economy in the last decades of the twentieth century were inequality increas-
ing forces. Second, the small number of countries that exhibit signiﬁ  cant increases in inequality followed 
broadly similar economic and social policies, with labour market deregulation perhaps being the most 
important.
The increases in inequality for the Anglo-Saxon ‘neoliberal four’ are striking for the dramatic 
and historical change that they represent. In the 1950s, Simon Kuznets famously argued that income 
inequality, across countries and over time in most countries, follows an inverted ‘U’ pattern with respect 
to per capita income: after an initial tendency for inequality to rise at low levels of per capita income, this 
tendency would reverse itself (Kuznets, 1955). This hypothesis implies that the inequality indices of the 
high-income countries would be found well below the medium value for all countries (since most coun-
tries with distributional data are middle-income). 
However, for the 1990s, all of the ‘liberalizing four’ had Gini coefﬁ  cients that were not signiﬁ  -
cantly different from the mean for the 104 countries included in Figure 4. The rise in inequality in the 
four ‘neoliberal’ countries would seem to refute the basic premise of the Kuznets hypothesis, which had 
been accepted as virtually a fundamental law governing the relationship between growth and inequality. In 
other words, policy-driven inequality in these four countries reversed the ‘fundamental law’ that devel-
oped countries tend to have more equal distributions than developing countries.
Looking across the OECD countries, the hypothesis that a general increase in inequality occurred 
in the 1980s and 1990s is not sustained. Rather, a statistically signiﬁ  cant increase in inequality occurred 
Inequality Trends in Some Developed OECD Countries  7
Figure 3:
Gini coefficients for Australia, the Netherlands,
New Zealand and Sweden, 1960s through 1990s
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in those countries that pursued a speciﬁ  c policy agenda. Indeed, one might say that inequality increased in 
those countries whose governments pursued an agenda that included as a principal component the concen-
tration of wealth and income at the top of the distribution.
Accounting for the changes
In the four OECD countries in which inequality signiﬁ  cantly increased, the proximate causes are clear. 
Reference to demographic changes, changes in the sectoral composition of output, and technological 
impact on skilling have their place in a longer-term analysis, but the sudden and dramatic increase in 
inequality in these countries has less subtle and more obvious causes.
Reduction in the progressivity of national tax structures, including a shift from direct to 
indirect taxes (from corporate and personal income taxes to sales, or VAT, taxes), a fall in 
the average income tax rates by reducing taxes at the top of the distribution, and reduction in 
corporate taxes and taxes on unearned income;
Reductions in expenditures on universal social programmes (e.g., unemployment compensa-
tion and old age pensions), resulting in declines in transfers from the public budget to low-in-
come households;
Increasing unemployment, which overwhelmingly affects those at the lower end of the in-
come distribution;
Elimination of the basic elements of the regulation of the ﬁ  nancial sector, generating a shift in 
the distribution of national income from proﬁ  ts to revenues and rents derived from ﬁ  nancial 
speculation; and
Declines in the strength of trade unions, especially in the United Kingdom and the United 
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The last effect, a fall in labour’s share, represents, as in the case of the Kuznets hypothesis, a 
change in what previously had been considered a fundamental parameter of developed countries, the dis-
tribution of factor shares.6
As listed above, the major instruments for restricting the accumulation of wealth and income in 
a few hands were progressive taxation, universal entitlement programmes (i.e., not targeted), and collec-
tive bargaining (especially when it was conducted at a national level). These instruments mediated the 
link between labour and product market competition and the distribution of income, such that measures 
of inequality varied relatively little during the 1950s and 1960s. Collective bargaining established a wage 
structure within industries such that relative wages and salaries remained relatively unchanged as the 
general level of income rose. This system came to be described in various terms, such as ‘social contract’ 
or, by left wing ‘regulationist’ writers as ‘the system of capitalist regulation’, with the latter based on what 
they called ‘Fordism’ (Aglietta, 1976).
Following from the theoretic analysis in the second section, we argue that the basis causal mecha-
nism for all of these proximate causes is the relative bargaining power of capital and labour, which, with 
the technical and social parameters of a country, determines the functional distribution of income. On the 
basis of this theory, we construct a simple model and apply it empirically. Increasing inequality works 
through long-term and short-term mechanisms. The major long-term mechanism is the net distributional 
impact of the public sector. While the trade movement working through the political process is an impor-
tant factor inﬂ  uencing progressive distributional policies, this occurs with a lag determined by country-
speciﬁ  c conditions and the speciﬁ  city of the redistributive mechanisms. The introduction of progressive 
mechanisms may occur only after a long period of union pressure, and persist in legislation after that pres-
sure has waned. Therefore, this long-term mechanism will enter the model in its proximate form rather 
than as a function of its underlying cause. On the basis of the distinction between long and short-run fac-
tors, we specify inequality to be the result of the progressiveness of the public budget and the bargaining 
power of non-capitalists:
Gt = Gt (Δt, Bt)
Where:
Gt = inequality, measured by the Gini coefﬁ  cient
Δt = progressive distributional effect of government expenditure and taxation
Bt = bargaining power of trade unions
Due to lack of data on the net incidence of taxation and expenditure, the share of current expendi-
ture in gross domestic product (GDP) serves as a proxy variable for the progressiveness of the public bud-
get. There are two aspects to this proxy. If the net progressive impact of all budgets were the same, then 
the share of expenditure would be an exact proxy were budgets always balanced, or the deﬁ  cit or surplus 
did not change. This is unlikely, either within or across countries. However, cross-country and intra-coun-
try experience suggests that the larger public expenditure is in GDP, the more progressive the net impact 
6  On what was then an apparent long-term stability in income distribution in the United States, see Kravis (1959; 
1960), and Goldsmith and others (1954).10  DESA Working Paper No. 6
of the budget. This is because important categories of public expenditure that have little or no distribution-
al impact are viewed as irreducible—military expenditure being an example. More straightforward is the 
bargaining power of organized labour, measured by the share of wage employees that are in trade unions, 
mediated by the unemployment rates, which indicates the ‘tightness’ of the labour market.
Δt = Δt(Et)
Bt = Bt(Ut, TUt)
Et = the share of government current expenditure in GDP
Ut = the national unemployment rate
TUt = share of wage employees in trade unions, ‘union density’ 
The relationship is assumed to take a multiplicative form. Substituting and using logarithms, the 
estimating equation becomes:
ln[Gt] = a0 + a1ln[Ut] + a2ln[Et] + a3ln[TUt] + a4C1 +…+anCn + ε
This is an equilibrium model, in that it assumes that inequality in each year completely adjusts to 
the value implied by the behavioural variables. The terms C1…Cn are dummy variables accounting for 
so-called ﬁ  xed affects across countries. The coefﬁ  cient on the unemployment variable is predicted to be 
positive, because it reduces the bargaining power of organized labour. Also, there is a direct distributional 
effect because involuntary cyclical and structural unemployment is suffered disproportionately by the 
lower and middle classes, and hardly at all by the wealthy. The government expenditure variable is pre-
dicted to be negative, because of ‘entitlement’ programmes in current budget outlays. Trade union density 
is predicted negative, for reasons discussed above.
The model is tested with data from seven countries: Australia, Canada, Germany, Japan, Sweden, 
the United Kingdom and the United States, for 1980-1998. The results of the cross-section, time series 
estimation are shown in Table 2. Because the Gini coefﬁ  cient is a summary measure of inequality, it is 
difﬁ  cult to interpret the absolute value of the coefﬁ  cients on the behavioural variables, except to note 
that they all have their predicted signs and are statistically signiﬁ  cant at less than a 5 per cent level of the 
probability that their true value is zero. The model accounts for almost 90 per cent of the variation in Gini 
coefﬁ  cients over time and across countries. It should be noted that the most statistically signiﬁ  cant vari-
able is trade union membership. 
Because cross-country regression should always be treated sceptically, we also apply this model 
to two countries for which there are sufﬁ  cient annual data, the United Kingdom and the United States. It 
is unfortunately the case that consistent data on trade union membership dates from the 1980s, providing 
a rather short time series. Nonetheless, the results for both countries support our argument that organized 
labour played a major role in reducing inequality. The results of the two country estimations are shown 
in Table 3. For the United Kingdom, the longer time series that omits trade union membership yields 
the predicted signs for unemployment and government expenditure, with both highly signiﬁ  cant. For the 
shorter time series that includes trade union membership, unemployment and government expenditure are Inequality Trends in Some Developed OECD Countries  11
intercorrelated, and neither signiﬁ  cant. However, trade union membership is signiﬁ  cant, at the .04 level of 
probability (see Figure 5). In the case of the United States, unemployment and trade union membership 
are intercorrelated, and the former was omitted. When this was done, trade union density and government 
expenditure proved to be signiﬁ  cant at lower than 1 per cent probability (see Figure 6).
In summary, statistical evidence supports the view that in countries in which inequality increased, 
this was primarily the result of the decline in the importance and bargaining power of organized labour, ag-
gravated by unemployment and reductions in government expenditure. In the long run, the three are closely 
related, because organized labour has historically pressed for full employment policies and a comprehen-
sive welfare state. At the risk of oversimpliﬁ  cation, it can be concluded that in the OECD countries, rising 
inequality results from a growing imbalance in the economic and political power of capital and labour.
Redeﬁ  ning the inequality and poverty agenda
The empirical evidence presented in this paper has shown dramatic increases in inequality in four OECD 
countries, with little change or decline in thirteen others. The evidence strongly suggests that increases in 
inequality have been the result of policies, most importantly, policies that have weakened the power of or-
ganized labour. Reductions in government social expenditure and abandoning full employment as a policy 
goal have also played a substantial role. 
Table 2:
Cross-country, time series estimation of the Gini 
coefﬁ  cient of inequality, seven countries, 1980-1998
Coeff Std Error t value Sig.
(Constant) 5.234 .232 22.57 .000
In(unemp)t .067 .023 2.06 .044
In(GovCurrExp)t -.356 .199 -2.99 .004
In(TUD)t -.236 .032 -7.24 .000
1. Australia .274 .031 8.88 .000
2. Germany -.198 .037 -5.35 .000
3. Sweden .427 .057 7.42 .000
4. UK -.036 .020 -1.82 .074
Summary:  Adj R Sq = .870
    F Stat = 52.75 sig @ .000
  DF  =  47
Sources: See Table 1 for Gini coefﬁ  cients; other variables, World Development Indicators 2003, ILO, International Labour 
Statistics (website).
Notes: For ﬁ  xed effects, the USA is the omitted country. Coefﬁ  cients for Canada and Japan were non-signiﬁ  cant and are not 
included. Years of coverage (total 61):
1. Australia: 1981, 1984, 1986, 1988, 1990, 1992, 1994, 1996-98 (10)
2. Canada: 1981-91, 1994 (12)
3. Germany: 1994, 1998 (2)
4. Japan: 1980, 1982, 1985, 1989-90 (5)
5. Sweden: 1989, 1991, 1993 (3)
6. UK: 1982, 1985-98 (15)
7. USA: 1983-96 (14)12  DESA Working Paper No. 6
Table 3:
United Kingdom and United States: 
Time series estimation of the Gini coefﬁ  cient of inequality
Statistics




















Adjusted R Square = .594 .572 .899






Durb-Wat =  1.468 1.520 1.800
DF = 25 14 34
Note: Numbers in parenthesis are the probabilities associated with the T-statistics (probability that the coefﬁ  cient is zero).
Figure 5:
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Thus, the policy challenge is to redeﬁ  ne or relocate the policy debate within a discourse of the 
equitable distribution of society’s wealth. While this would require a serious discussion of the concentra-
tion of private economic power in the developed countries, it is not a radical agenda. On the contrary, the 
social judgement that inequality not justiﬁ  ed by allocative criteria is unfair and dysfunctional for society 
was the national consensus in virtually all advanced market economies for thirty years after the Second 
World War. One does not need to ‘reinvent’ arguments for an equitable distribution of society’s wealth, 
but merely to invoke that consensus in the context of a globalizing world.
Figure 6:
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